

Yasukuni-Jinja and Folk Religion: The Problem of Vengeful Spirits

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THE YASUKUNI DEBATE¹

Since the first official visit paid by a Japanese Prime Minister to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of the Pacific war on August 15th, 1985, the problem of the Yasukuni Shrine is being discussed even in Western European newspapers.² We read that Yasukuni, the shrine for the war dead, is regarded as a symbol of Japanese militarism and that therefore official visits imply a vindication of that former political system. But what is not understood among the public here are the deeper roots of the problem.

The issue centers mainly on the question whether the shrine is a mere *memorial*, to be compared to the tombs of the Unknown Soldier in Western countries, or if it is a real *shrine* in the sense of a definite religious place, a holy site of the Shintō religion.

The political and ideological dimensions of this discussion are obvious. If the shrine is *not* a religious place, as it is declared by a strong and influential faction of the Association of Shintō Shrines (*Jinja-honchō* 神社本庁), then it could easily be taken under governmental control again, as it was until the end of the war. The opposition foresees a revival of so called State Shintō, the allegedly nonreligious state cult of the Meiji up to the early Shōwa period where the Shintō shrines were mere ceremonial stages for the celebration of folk "customs" in accordance with the fundamentals of *kokutai* thought (see below pp. 131–132). Therefore the political dimension of the recent discussion is for the most part an extension of its religious aspect, that is to say of the question whether or not Yasukuni is a place of religion.

THE OFFICIAL CONCEPT OF THE YASUKUNI DEITIES

Originally founded under the name of Shōkonsha 招魂社 (“ Shrine for calling the Spirits of the Dead ”) in Kyōto, the shrine was transferred to Tokyo and its name was changed to Yasukuni-jinja on the 4th of June, 1879.³

All the spirits of the dead loyalists of the Meiji Restoration, which had already been enshrined in various places, were transferred to this shrine.

The name of the shrine, “ Yasukuni,” was given by Emperor Meiji, who wrote the following in an address to the deified spirits of the war dead since the Restoration (beginning with the year 1853):

With a loyal and honest heart you have passed away, not worrying about your homes, not minding your own lives. Founded on these great and highly heroic deeds, our Great Empire is to rule as a peaceful land (*yasukuni* 安國); so We renamed (this shrine) *Yasukuni-jinja* 靖國神社, “ Shrine of the Peaceful Land ” and made it an Imperial Shrine of Special Status (*bekkaku-kanpeisha* 別格官幣社). We vow to make sacrifices of paper and silk (*mitegara* 幣) and of laudatory congratulations, and, from now on forever, to worship and admire you.⁴

From that time on the spirits of all soldiers who fell in the wars Japan fought were enshrined on Kudan hill in Tokyo. For the soldiers and their families it became a source of deep pride that even the emperor paid his respect to the shrine and worshipped the divinities of Yasukuni, who were in fact the children of ordinary people.⁵

The programmatical script on the essentials of *kokutai* 國體 ideology, the *Kokutai no hongī* written in 1937, states:

The Emperor’s deeds that remain with us are so many as to defy enumeration when we cite such things as how he enshrines as deities in Yasukuni shrine those loyal subjects that have sacrificed their lives for the nation since about the time of the Restoration, lauding their meritorious deeds without regard to standing or position, and how he poured out his great august heart in giving relief in times of natural calamities.⁶

These were the essential factors for the deification of soldiers: *Everyone* who died for the Empire in a war was deified and became a protecting god for the country, therefore the name of Yasukuni, “ Peaceful Country.” Moreover, this point was understood as an expression

of imperial gratitude to the people, and served, of course, as a means of strengthening the new dynastic idea in post-Tokugawa times.

A PARALLEL IN HISTORY: ANKOKUJI

Since the Yasukuni shrine was founded during the Meiji period, it first of all has to be explained in the context of the ideological and religious world-view of this epoch. However, it is apparent that for a deeper understanding we must take religious ideas into consideration, which have their origins outside the sphere of this particular problem.

One of the specific traits of Meiji thought was the total disapproval of Buddhist ideas. But in fact we do find an historical parallel in Buddhism itself, which in turn further supports our understanding of the Yasukuni Shrine.

The term *yasukuni* may be read *ankoku* in Sino-Japanese pronunciation. We learn from history that in medieval times there existed so-called *Ankokuji*, temples whose names were written with the characters *ankoku* (安國), "Peaceful Land." These characters were used also by Emperor Meiji to clarify the functions of the Yasukuni Shrine, which was thought to be a shrine for a "Peaceful Land."

The Ankoku temples were founded in the early 14th century by the first Ashikaga shōgun Takauji and his brother Tadayoshi, following the advise of the famous Rinzaï Zen master Musō (Soseki) Kokushi.

One of the motifs for founding these temples⁷ was to elevate the Rinzaï faction of Zen into a superior position against the other Buddhist schools of the country. Furthermore it was intended to strengthen the power of the Ashikaga Bakufu over the land, since the temples were administrated by the *shugo* 守護 of the Ashikaga family. But the system was not successful, and after the death of Takauji the Ankokuji nearly all disappeared.⁸ The political aspect of the foundation of the Ankokuji seems to be predominant. But the religious dimension should not be neglected.

A parallel can be drawn between the systems of the modern Yasukuni Shrine and its provincial Gokoku 護國 shrines⁹ on the one hand, and the medieval Ankoku temples on the other. The Ankokuji also were established in favor of the souls of fallen warriors, especially for the war dead of the Genkō era (1331-1333) battles.¹⁰

Sansom (1981, 372) writes on the motifs of Takauji:

He wanted to have in every province an emblem of the spread of his influence over all Japan. But also he hoped to create good feeling by his pious enterprises, which was meant to comfort the spirits of those who had perished in his campaigns, both friends

and foes.

In an analysis of Buddhist temple names Dietrich Seckel (1985) establishes a system of fourteen categories of names. His tenth category is of importance in our context. It contains temple names which deal with 1) the peace of the country, and 2) the protection of the country and the emperor.

Seckel states that “pacification” (*chin* 鎮) and “peace” (*an* 安) are “just two aspects of the same thing” (Seckel 1985, 204); so we find names such as *Chinkokuji* 鎮國寺, “temples for the pacification of the country,” together with *Ankokuji*, “temples for the peace of the country.”

“The meanings of ‘calming’ and ‘pacification,’” writes the author (Seckel 1985, 205), “are combined in the term *chin-an* 鎮安 which then bifurcates, so to speak, into the two temple names of *Chinkokuji* and *Ankokuji*.—The terms *chin*—*shizumeru* (‘to calm,’ ‘to pacify’) and *mamoru* (‘to protect’) play a role also in Shintō: the cult of the gods (*kami*) is for a good part understood as the ‘pacification’ of evil or dangerous powers and as a prevention against un auspicious influences. *Chinkonsai* 鎮魂祭 is the feast ‘to pacify’ the souls of the dead which have become *kami*.”

It is clear that the connection between the two spheres of Buddhist *Ankokuji* and Shintoist *Yasukuni* shrine is deeper than a mere similarity based on the analogy of names; it is founded on similarities in the field of a religious conception.

From the viewpoint of a pure historical comparison we could hardly find a greater contrast than the one which exists between these two areas. *Ashikaga Takauji* and the Northern Court of the Namboku era in Japanese history were regarded as totally negative factors in history, at least according to the tennōistic historiography in the *Dainihonshi*, 大日本史 (“History of Great Japan”), of the Mito school. Furthermore, *Takauji* was a follower of *Musō* (Soseki) *Kokushi* and therefore a patron of Buddhism. Despite all these differences between the medieval *Ankoku* temples and the *Yasukuni* shrine in historical, intellectual, and religious meaning, we face a nearly identical underlying religious idea: all are places intended to give the country peace through the deification of fallen warriors of former wars.

As it was pointed out above, the idea of the *pacification* of the souls of the dead plays a basic role within this idea. So it is crucial to investigate whether or not this aspect is of importance for the understanding of the *Yasukuni* Shrine problem.

THE HERETICAL INTERPRETATION

The Yasukuni problem was treated by several authors in academic discussion within the last years. Special mention should be made of the works of Ôe Shinobu (1982), Murakami Shigeyoshi (1974) and Ernst Lokowandt (1978 and 1981). These authors demonstrated that the problem under consideration has its foundation in the history and the ideological background of the shrine.

A new, we may say heretical, definition of the Yasukuni gods, which produced even an academic incident in recent times (cf. Shimagawa 1985), is discussed by some of the authors (Shimagawa 1985; Ôe 1984).¹¹ Here the emphasis for understanding the real nature of the Yasukuni gods is put not on the orthodox aspects of imperial gratitude and protection of the country through the deified spirits of the heroic dead, but rather on the state of mind of the soldiers themselves. It is stated that their will to live was crushed, their deaths seemed without sense, and their spirits were full of hatred and frustration.¹² Therefore, Shimagawa states, in the very moment of their deaths they had become bitterly hating, vengeful gods—*onryôgami* 怨霊神—a term very well known from the history of Japanese religion.

Onryô 怨霊 or *goryô* 御霊, the “vengeful spirits of the dead,” are a specimen of deities whose cult flourished especially in the Heian period of Japanese history. The first incident of a *goryô-e* 御霊会, a ceremony for the pacification of such vengeful spirits which were regarded as a great danger for the community of the living, is reported from the year Jōgan 5, that is A.D. 863. The most prominent *goryô*-deity in history is Tenman-tenjin, the deified spirit of Sugawara Michizane, famous statesman and opponent of the Fujiwara family. His case shows all of the important elements of the historical *goryô*-cult. A man of high social position dies an unnatural death caused either by a personal enemy or through political intrigue. His spirit is thus full of hate and bitterness.¹³

The monk Jien writes in his historical work *Gukanshō* dating from about 1219:

The main point about a vengeful soul is that it bears a deep grudge and makes those who caused the grudge objects of its revenge even while the resentful person is still alive. When the vengeful soul is seeking to destroy the objects of its resentment . . . the state is thrown into disorder by the slanders and lies it generates. The destruction of the people is brought about in exactly the same way. And if the vengeful soul is unable to obtain its revenge while in this visible world, it will do so from the realm of

the invisible.¹⁴

In medieval times the belief in vengeful souls (*goryō-shinkō* 御霊信仰) flourished among the ordinary people too.¹⁵ As Hori Ichirō (1968, 21) points out, it was mainly spread by Nenbutsu priests. In this belief, the mental state at the very moment of death was regarded as essential for the future fate of the soul. Everybody bearing a grudge in his heart while dying would become an *onryō*, while the others enjoyed rebirth in Amida's paradise. "Sometimes," Hori (1968: 123) states, "Nenbutsu-hijiri advanced in the midst of battlefields to offer Nenbutsu to the spirits of those who had fallen, as well as to give dying soldiers assurance of salvation by Amida Butsu, urging them to pray Nenbutsu." This definitely is also the mental basis for interpreting the Yasukuni gods as *onryō*.

But there exists another item to be taken into consideration: The concept of *goryō* is an extremely *individualistic* one. The individual hatred and bitterness, the individual fear, do determine the fate of the soul in the afterlife. But in the case of the Yasukuni Shrine it is a fact that all of the souls of the war dead are enshrined as deities without regard to their former lives and the individual circumstances of their deaths.

THE CONCEPT OF "BAD DEATH"

Do we therefore have to reject the *onryō* concept of the Yasukuni gods as a whole? I do not think so. We know that the traditional Japanese attitude toward death was extremely negative and timorous. The living feared pollution by death, as we can see for the first time in the myths surrounding Izanagi and Izanami.¹⁶ Especially feared were the spirits of such persons who died an unnatural and premature death, or who died far from home as strangers.

With this belief we arrive at a *conceptual* and general instead of an *individual* view of a horrible fate of the soul that is widespread among many societies, especially among peoples of South East Asia. As for the concept of premature and unnatural death, there exists the technical term of "bad death"¹⁷ in comparative religion.

This term describes a specific view of the dead which is based on fear and horror on the side of the living. In this world view the premature and abnormal ways of death are regarded as being the same by definition, since to suffer early death means that the deceased cannot live his whole life to its natural end. Only other than natural causes can be responsible for such a sad and exceptionally dangerous fate. For the spirit of the departed this kind of death bears the consequence of not

being able to enter the afterlife, that is to say, the other side and next stage of human existence, because it was not able to go through all stages of life (cf. Jensen 1960, 366).

The living human being is taught through several *rites de passage* during its lifetime all the answers which the spirit of the dead needs to know in order to pass the interrogation at the entrance to the next world. One who dies too early cannot pass this examination; he will fall into a state of loneliness and must wander around homelessly in the realm between the two worlds of the living and the dead, always trying to lure living men into his own horrible state of existence. In a thorough study, *Der schlimme Tod bei den Völkern Indonesiens*, Hans Joachim Sell (1955) provides rich material concerning this religious concept.

As was stated before, within this idea the *way* of dying plays an important role for the fate of the spirit of the dead. Therefore it is of high importance for the problem under consideration here that among the different ways of unnatural deaths there are two which are always mentioned: one is the death of the childbearing mother—she becomes a very dangerous ghost—, and the other is the death of the warrior.¹⁸

THE "BAD DEATH" OF THE WARRIOR

From the Toradja of Sulawesi (Celebes), for example, we hear that the soul of a fallen warrior becomes a wicked ghost, called *bolinde*, which tries to frighten and kill living people (Sell 1955, 178). On the Islands of Solor and Adonare the fallen war dead are hung on a pole outside of the village like slaughtered pigs; only after four days will they be buried (Sell 1955, 232–233).

Several reports tell us how human communities try to protect themselves against the evil influences of the ghosts of the dead warriors. In Eastern Indonesia, on the Island of Halmahera, the Galela build little shrines, called "soul huts," for the spirits of the dead in the vicinity of the house of the bereaved family. The ghosts, being homeless and lonesome, are thought to be most dangerous to the members of their own families. Through this kind of ceremony, the community whose fear of ghosts is very strong tries to catch the troubled soul. Thus they hope to make the ghost harmless (Sell 1955, 39). On the Island of Samoa in Polynesia, people want to pacify and comfort the soul definitely by catching it. Thereafter, it is mentioned, nobody has to fear the ghost any longer (Sell 1955: 39).

We learn from the examples shown here that in this kind of archaic worldview the dead warrior is anything else but a hero; instead he becomes a "bad dead," one who is feared especially by his own relatives. They try to calm and pacify the spirit—as in the Indonesian case by

erecting a *shrine* for the soul. According to this conception the emotions of fear and horror lead to the worship of the dead warrior.

YASUKUNI SHRINE AND THE "BAD DEATH" OF THE SOLDIER

Since ancient times the motif of calming, pacifying, and appeasing evil powers and especially souls is a prominent aspect of Shintō religion. We hear, for example, about the Mitamashizume-matsuri or Chinkonsai, the "Feast of Pacification of Spirits," which is mentioned in the Engi-shiki of the 10th century.¹⁹ This ceremony had "as its purpose to prolong the live of the sovereign and pacify or soothe the ancestral spirits" (Bock 1970, vol. 1: 94, note 306).

About the belief of the ordinary people of that time not much is written down, surely because of the fact that the writers of noble birth did not bear any interest in the religious emotions of peasants and fishermen. But through folklore research we have information and descriptions about the fear of human ghosts and especially of those who recently died an unnatural death.

In folk belief, one who died from natural causes is said to become a *hotoke* 仏, a "Buddha." But those who die too early, that is to say especially the young and unmarried, will become "wandering spirits" who are perilous to the living. An impressive table showing the correlation between the way of death and the future fate of the soul is given by Robert J. Smith; he shows that all young people as well as unmarried adults dying an abnormal death will become "a wandering spirit" (Smith 1974, 55).

These spirits are called *muen-botoke* 無縁仏, "Buddhas without attachment or affiliation," or *gaki* 餓鬼, "hungry ghosts," originally a term for those who have to exist in the second of the ten Buddhist worlds, suffering from eternal hunger and thirst.²⁰ "From long ago," Yanagita Kunio (1970, 94) wrote, "people of Japan have had a dread of meeting such homeless spirits."

In the folk belief of Okinawa, too, we find the concept of bad death. One who died a violent death is said to become a *majimung* spirit which is extremely perilous to the living. It is able to materialize in any form or body and is calmed down only when it catches the spirit of a living being (Lebra 1966, 29-30).

In the early modern period of Japanese history, that is to say since the Restoration, the people who had such a distinct view of the sad fate of a "wandering soul" must have felt emotions towards the largest group of such young and mostly unmarried dead, who even died far from home in many instances. This is the group of fallen soldiers, the war dead. They were ideal examples of those who died a premature

“bad” death.

This surely is a concept identical to the idea of “bad death” shown above. Folk belief preserves the conceptual fear of the “bad death” which is quite different from the individualistic view of *goryō-shinkō*. Not because of personal hatred or frustration, but because of a specific way and/or time of death, the soul becomes a harmful ghost.

CONCLUSION

As we have seen above, the violent death of a *warrior* is widely regarded as a distinct kind of “bad death.” It is apparent, in my opinion, that in Japan the fear of such ghosts existed since early times. This becomes obvious in light of the existence of the historical Chinkokuji and Ankokuji temples, as we have seen. Their religious basis was *not* a specific Buddhist one, but rested rather on archaic religious emotions and fears, which had their roots outside of Buddhism.

Seen from this standpoint, we arrive at far reaching consequences. It is known that Japan from the Meiji down to early Shōwa period was based on an ideological system called “familism.” The Confucian ethical maxims of *chū* 忠, “loyalty,” and *kō* 孝, “filial piety,” were blended into an ideal of the Japanese nation, which itself was regarded as a *real* family with the emperor as its center.

This view of the *kokutai*, the “national body” (Bellah 1957, 99), “national polity” (Woodard 1967, 71), or “national entity” (Gauntlett/Hall 1949, passim) of Japan, as the term is variously translated, was elaborated mainly by the philosophers of the Mito school of late Tokugawa Japan. It was the Mito scholar Aizawa Seishisai (1782–1863) who introduced the term for the first time to the theoretical debate on the state in Japan in his work *Shinron* 新論, (“A New Discourse”) in the year 1825.²¹ Here *kokutai* does not mean the “body” of any nation in general, but definitely and exclusively the specific characteristics of the Japanese nation only.

Although the heterogenous elements of the *kokutai* thought were known to the philosophical world of Japan since long ago—the Confucian concepts of loyalty and filial piety on the one side and the Koku-gaku idea of Japan as a “land of the gods” (*shinkoku* 神國), on the other side—it was the ideologists of the Imperial Restoration who on this basis elaborated the *kokutai* thought with the idea of the *uniqueness* of the Japanese nation as its center.

In the Meiji period this became the official concept of the state. Japan was regarded as a great family. Since all Japanese citizens were thought to be descendants of the mythical ancestors with the Imperial line at its top—an idea based on the mythology and elaborated by the

Kokugaku scholar Hirata Atsutane—it resulted in the idea of the Japanese nation as a *real* family, not merely a family-like body.

The famous Imperial Rescript on Education, *kyōiku [ni kansuru] chokugo*, 教育勅語, dated October 30, 1890, states (official translation):

Know ye, Our Subjects:

Our Imperial Ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue; Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire. . . .

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors, to be observed alike by Their Descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence, in common with you, Our subjects, that We may thus attain to the same virtue.²²

Wilbur M. Fridell (1970, 829) writes on the family state ideology of the late Meiji years: “Filial piety practiced in the individual family became, without change, loyalty to the comprehensive or national family. The traditional patterns and values of the individual family must be strengthened and maintained, . . . , for it was the individual family system which supported the comprehensive (national) family system and thereby preserved *kokutai*.”

But this concept of *kokutai* contains a specific risk within the context discussed here. If one single family has to fear the souls of members who died from unnatural causes, so, of course, the nation as a whole (as the “family of families”) has to fear the totality of members who die such bad deaths. To calm and pacify them and—we remember the East Indonesian case—to make them harmless, a shrine has to be erected and specific ceremonies have to be undertaken. In these ways the religious fears of the ordinary people, based on the folk belief in evil ghosts, could be appeased.

In Tokugawa times the cult of the heroic warrior was a specimen of the bushi class. After the Restoration everybody, regardless of rank and social position, could serve in the army. This, in my opinion, created a political need to change the fear of wandering perilous spirits into a feeling of pride in the heroism of the war dead.

That these are no mere speculations is shown by the words of the Imperial Rescript given by the Meiji Tennō on the occasion of founding the Kyōto Shōkonsha, dated from the 10th of May, 1868. Much is said in this rescript about imperial gratitude and the loyalty of the

dead; but in one short sentence the other, the horrible side of heroism, becomes visible. Here it is said that the shrine is also erected with the intention of soothing and pacifying (*nagusameru* 慰める) the souls of the dead.²³

Even in the ongoing discussion on the status of the Yasukuni Shrine this aspect can be clearly seen in documents related to the shrine. A bill (cited by Lokowandt) dated June 1969, which was brought in to achieve governmental control over the shrine by *denying* its religious nature, we find, among the aims of the Yasukuni Shrine, the orthodox view that it serves to express the *admiration* of the entire people for those who sacrificed themselves for the sake of the country. But on the other side it is stated that the shrine shall *pacify* and appease them. Ceremonies and feasts, says the text, shall be conducted in order to pacify the spirits of the fallen soldiers.²⁴

From all this the idea arises conclusively that the country in fact becomes a *yasukuni*, a "peaceful land," because the warriors as "bad dead" are no longer a threat and danger to it. In this view the country is protected *from* instead of being protected *by* the spirits of the fallen warriors.

NOTES

1. This is a revised and enlarged version of a paper presented to the XXXIInd International Congress for Asian and North African Studies, Hamburg, August 25-30, 1986. For further information see my recent article (Antoni 1987b).

2. Cf. for example the extensive article in the German weekly magazine *Der Spiegel*, August 26, 1985.

3. Cf. the document in Murakami 1974, 107; Lokowandt 1978, 328-329, No. D 94; Kawada 1982, 66-67.

4. Translation based on the Japanese original of the address (Murakami 1974, 109; Yasukuni-jinja-musho 1975, 1). The translation given by the shrine office differs in several ways: "You have given your lives for your country. You sacrificed yourselves to make the country peaceful. This shrine was established to invoke your spirits. We call the Shrine the Yasukuni (to make the country peaceful) Shrine. We are sure to continue to offer prayers forever for the sake of your spirits." (Yasukuni-jinja-musho 1975, 1).

5. Holtom (1963, 5) illustrates this point by discussing the case of a liberal University professor, who, in the year 1938, asked publicly whether a man of clearly bad character will become a deity of the shrine too. He was attacked for this by official sources: "He was accused of having insulted the national structure and of having heaped indignity on the sacred spirits of the warrior dead and the holy cause in which they had given their lives The sacred quality of the divine emperor attaches to a Japanese the supreme command of an emperor who can do nothing wrong 'No matter how much of a wrongdoer, no matter how evil, a Japanese subject may have been, when once he has taken his stand on the field of battle, all his past sins are entirely atoned for and they become as nothing'."

6. Mombushō 1937, 31; Gauntlett/Hall 1949: 77.
7. Most of the temples were not newly built. These temples merely received new names and became incorporated into the new system. It is said that the first of the Ankokuji was the former Kumeta temple in Izumi province, which was renamed in the year 1338. Detailed information on the problem is given by Imaeda 1962, 72–79; Matsunaga 1974–76, vol. II: 223–227; Akamatsu/Yampolsky 1977, 313–315.
8. A list of all Ankokuji, as it can be reconstructed, is given by Imaeda 1962, 76–78.
9. Parallel to Yasukuni-jinja, the national shrine for the war dead, there exists in every prefecture a prefectural shrine for the war dead under the name of Gokoku-jinja 護國神社 (“Shrine for the Protection of the Country”). These shrines were until 1939 registered as regional Shōkonsha. Okada 1982, 161; Lokowandt 1978: 96, n. 351; Kawada 1982, 68.
10. Cf. Imaeda 1962, 74; Akamatsu/Yampolsky 1977, 314; Matsunaga 1974–1976, II: 226; Benl 1955, 90.
11. See especially Ōe 1984, 115–120.
12. Shimagawa 1985, 19.
13. Two descriptive works were published in recent years regarding the historical *goryō* complex, Tubielewicz 1980 and Plutschow 1983. Here the fate of Sugawara Michizane and other prominent cases, as the one of Prince Sawara, are discussed in detail.
14. *Gukanshō*, fasz. 7=NKBT 86: 339, KT 19: 220–221; Brown/Ishida 1979, 220–221.
15. Cf. Horii 1968, 117; Horii 1953–1955, II: 457–470.
16. According to Japanese mythology, Izanagi-no-mikoto purified himself after his visit to the land of the dead (Kojiki, I (NKBT 1, 69–71); Chamberlain (repr.) 1982, 44–49).
17. The term “bad death” is a direct translation of the German “der schlimme Tod,” which is a *terminus technicus* in the history of religions. In 1955 Hans Joachim Sell published his great work on this concept of death among the Indonesian peoples.
18. Sell (1955, 3) lists up, among others, the following different ways of death and categories of dead persons: the death of a mother in childbirth, of the fallen warrior, dead children, murdered persons, and subjects of accidental death, suicide, and execution.
19. *Engi-shiki*, fasz. 2, *shiji-sai* 2 (KT 26: 42–44); cf. Bock 1970, vol. 1: 94–97.
20. Cf. Mochizuki 1954–1958: *gaki*; Yanagita 1970, 93.
21. Cf. Aizawa Seishisai in *Mitogaku-zenshu*, 1933, vol. 2: 2–325. According to Lokowandt (1978: 56, note 126) the term was introduced even earlier by Kuriyama Senpō (1671–1706).
22. Cf. Gauntlett/Hall 1949, 192; for the Japanese version see Ōkubo 1969, 425; Murakami 1974, 154.
23. The text of the Imperial Rescript is given by Murakami 1974, 28–29; cf. Lokowandt 1978, 259.
24. Cf. part I, sec. 1 and part IV, sec. 22/1/II of the bill, which was brought in for the first time by a group of members of parliament of the LDP on June 30, 1969; cf. Lokowandt 1981, 18; 173–181.

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