Harald Tambs-Lyche
Université de Picardie-Jules Verne

The Bourgeoisie Comes from Elsewhere

The Gauḍa Sāraswat Brahmins and Catholics of South Kanara

South Kanara, the region around Mangalore, Karnataka, lacks an indigenous merchant caste. The bourgeoisie here is mainly constituted by two groups—the Gauḍa Sāraswat Brahmins (GSB) and the Catholics. Both came from Goa and speak Konkaṇī, an Indo-European language, while the local speech is Tuḷu, a Dravidian language. Both groups are external to the regionalist "Tuḷu movement" and to the "*bhūta* cults" that define regional religious traditions outside of mainstream Hinduism. Though they have lived for several centuries in South Kanara, both groups tend to be seen as "immigrants." This constellation of an identity-conscious Tuḷu society representing "traditional" culture and a "foreign" bourgeoisie, together with the present assertions, particularly by the GSB, toward Hindu dominance, might seem to threaten plural society in the region. Yet South Kanara, accustomed to cultural pluralism for centuries, seems able to maintain a discourse on the region as an object characterized by its multiple cultures and religions.

Keywords: India—South Kanara—caste—plural society—region

Asian Ethnology Volume 83, Number 1 · 2024, 103–121

Defining a region is never a straightforward matter. In India, however, it is tempting and often practical to delimit a territory where a single caste is dominant, in the sense of traditionally having control over most of the land (Schwartzberg 2017).[1] This approach presupposes, however, that land control remains at the core of the social organization of the area. Then, we should realize that a caste that is dominant in one region may form a minority in another: indeed, the constellation of majority and minorities is likely to be particular to any region and to form one of its main characteristics.

When I tried, years ago, to pose the question of whether and why the peninsula of Saurashtra, in Gujarat, formed a region, I stressed a different point: it must be seen as a region because an indigenous discourse focuses on it, as the locus of debate between castes or other groups (Tambs-Lyche 1994). Both these approaches may, of course, be related in their turn to the features of natural geography: with a peninsula such as Saurashtra, such features may seem obvious. But I shall insist, here, on social and ideological factors as fundamental to the issue.

The region called South Kanara—which formerly coincided with the district of that name but is now divided between two districts, South Kanara and Uḍupi—is less obviously delimitated by physical geography. To the east, certainly, the Western Ghats form a natural barrier toward the plains of eastern Karnataka. The river complex Sītā forms the northern boundary, but there is no obvious change in physical geography across the river. Here, however, there is a language boundary, which coincides with a change in the dominant landholding caste: the Bunts to the south of the river speak Tuḷu, while the otherwise rather similar Nāḍavas north of the Sītā are Kannaḍa speakers. The Bunts, as well as other Tuḷu-speaking castes of South Kanara, are matrilineal, while the Nāḍava and most other castes to the north are patrilineal. To the south, the limits of South Kanara are purely political, as its Bunt-dominated, Tuḷu-speaking, and matrilineal society continues into Kāsaragoḍ, the northernmost district of Kerala. Historically and culturally, then, this northernmost *taluk* of Kerala belongs to the region traditionally designated as Tuḷunāḍu, the land of the Tuḷu speakers. Some Tuḷu speakers, then, feel that when state boundaries were redrawn along language lines in 1961, Tuḷunāḍu should have formed a separate state. By Indian standards, however, Tuḷu is a small language: it does not have its own script, as the larger regional languages in India do, and modern Tuḷu literature was still modest in the 1960s but has grown significantly in more recent decades.[2] Tuḷu

has not gained recognition as a regional language, and the project of a Tuḷu state has remained the dream of a few local activists (Rao 2010, 288–90). This is dramatically demonstrated by the Tuḷu-speaking area being divided between Kerala, defined as the Malayalam-speaking state, and Karnataka, the state of Kannaḍa speakers.

Still, most people in South Kanara speak of it as their homeland. It certainly corresponds to the criteria of being an object on which regional discourse is centered (Tambs-Lyche 1994). Across caste, community, and language barriers, there is considerable local patriotism in South Kanara. Language divisions contribute, in fact, to the focus on South Kanara as an object of discourse, for Tuḷu is only one among several languages spoken in the region. The Gauḍa Sāraswat Brahmins, who have been dominant in the region's commerce for at least three hundred years, are Konkani speakers. So are most of the members of the important Catholic community, while the various Muslim groups speak different languages. The Byaris in and around Mangalore have their own dialect, usually seen as a mixture of Tuḷu and Malayalam, and Deccani Muslims regard themselves as Urdu speakers who speak the Deccani dialect of Urdu that developed in Bijapur and other sultanates of the peninsula. The Navayats, centered on Bhatkal farther north but present in Mangalore, speak a variant of Konkani. Mapila Muslims and other people originally from Kerala speak Malayalam. There are also a number of Marathi and Malayalam-speaking immigrants, mainly from the lower castes. Finally, Kannaḍa is not just the official language but also functions, to some extent, as a lingua franca between the linguistic groups, and there are quite a few Kannaḍa speakers from elsewhere in the state, who have retained their language. Perhaps even more important as a lingua franca among the middle classes is English.

Thus, while Tuḷu remains the popular language of the countryside, and of much of the urban population, a major part of the bourgeoisie[3] speaks Konkani. Concerning the land of the Tuḷus, then, Tuḷu is far from being a universal language. In this context, "South Kanara" is a regional term that transcends linguistic and cultural differences, avoiding the precedence that the term "Tuḷunadu" gives to Tuḷu culture and language, and which signals the acceptance of the Tuḷu speakers as a majority in the region.

The Tuḷu speakers

To Tuḷu speakers, however, South Kanara is a Tuḷu-speaking region, forming the core of the Tuḷu-speaking lands, Tuḷunadu. This is how it is generally seen by the Bunts, the dominant landholding caste of the region, as well as by the Billavas, the largest community in the region, which traditionally included small farmers, tenants, and agricultural labor on Bunt lands, as well as coconut growers—often owning their own plots—on the coast. The Mogavīra fishermen, another large Tuḷu-speaking caste, reach into the coast north of the Sita rivers, but they are mainly concentrated in South Kanara. A number of smaller Tuḷu-speaking castes are also present here. These include the Jains, who were never dominant in the usual sense of the term, since they were—and still are—few in number. They were, however, central to regional history, since most of the land in South Kanara belonged to a series of small Jain kingdoms.

These kingdoms were at their apogee from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, maintaining their regional power under Vijayanagar, though they lost much of their influence during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, when the country was ruled by the Ikkeri Nāyaka dynasty from the northeast (Bhat 1975, 60–141). Under these rulers, the Bunt chiefs, originally vassals of the Jains, gained in autonomy and importance, sometimes becoming rivals to the Jains for power and prestige. Under Haidar and Tipu, the successive kings of Mysore, the Jain kingdoms were not allowed much autonomy, and when the British took over South Kanara in 1800, none of the Jain kingdoms were acknowledged as princely states. Still, several Jain families reside within the region, occupying an important position in rituals as well as in the popular imagination. Many people remember to which kingdom their villages belonged, and the frontiers between these domains continue to inform local perceptions of the region. Some of the descendants of these kings are still being formally enthroned, known as "taking *paṭṭa abhiṣekha*."

There were Jain kings in North Kanara, too, but their kingdoms and the memories of them have to a great extent disappeared. In the south toward Kāsaragoḍ district, the most important state Vittala, whose "capital" was in South Kanara, was a Hindu kingdom. The Jain kingdoms are still present in memory and celebrated in rituals such as the *nēma*, discussed in the following paragraphs, and this contributes to the specificity of South Kanara as a region. This centuries-long Jain influence has also produced a marked contrast to the situation in Kerala, where Brahmin settlements had a central role in the constitution of the state (Veluthat 2009, 301). Brahmin influence is far less important in South Kanara, where the religion of the Tuḷu speakers traditionally and to a considerable extent even now revolves around the so-called "*bhūta*" cults (Carrin 1997; Chinnappa Gowda 2005, 17–38). The *bhūta* (literally, "spirit") deities (often characterized as demigods) have very weak links to all-Indian Hinduism, though they are usually said to be the *gaṇa* (flock or troupe) of Shiva; they are linked in general to lineage traditions in honor of clan or family leadership. The ritual of these cults, where possession is a central feature, is quite distinct from other forms of Hinduism in the region. The most prominent deities, the royal *bhūta*s or *rājandaiva*s, were—and are—the protectors of the Jain kingdoms and Bunt chiefdoms (as well as of some manors taken over by members of other castes, notably Gauḍa Sāraswat Brahmins), and the main annual ritual, the *nēma*, still acknowledges these political units, which no longer have any legal existence. The *nēma* entertains the ritual unity of the chief and his (former) dependents, while the numerous caste *bhūta*s, as opposed to the *rājandaiva*s, address the unity and specificity of each community (Carrin and Tambs-Lyche 2003; Brückner 1995).[4]

Most important among these are the twins Koṭi and Chennayya (Carrin 2016; Kalmody 2007), who serve as symbols for the revendications of their ex-untouchable caste, the Billavas. Their cult is linked to a modern rhetoric of resistance to oppression. Apart from a presence to "bless" some of the most important *nēma*s, Brahmins generally do not have important roles in the *bhūta* cults.

Though Brahmin settlements never reached the importance they had in Kerala, they have considerable presence in South Kanara, notably in the coastal zone and especially around Uḍupi. There were Brahmins in the area probably since the seventh

century (Ramesh 1970, 274), and they must have served in the Shiva temples, which flourished under the Alupa rulers (seventh to fourteenth century CE). We know the Pāṇḍyas invited a large number of Brahmins to Tamiḷnāḍu from the north during the eighth century, but the main immigration to South Kanara is much later. It is described in two texts, the *Grāmapaddhati* and the *Sahyādri Kaṇḍa*, probably dating from the between the fourteenth and the fifteenth century, and the actual migration may be dated to the thirteenth century. The geographical origin of these settlers has not been established. These texts describe the Brahmin settlements in some detail (Rao 2005). They describe thirty-two Brahmin settlements in Tuḷunadu (South Kanara and Kāsaragoḍ), while sixty-four are mentioned for Kerala and sixteen for North Kanara; these numbers give an impression of the relative importance of Brahmins in the three regions. These were *brahmadeya* villages donated to Brahmins for service to a temple, with *agrahāra*s or living quarters exclusively for Brahmins and temple lands controlled by the Brahmin community though farmed by members of other castes.

For South Kanara, the texts clearly show the predominance of the settlement traditionally called Shivaḷḷi, which in fact covers Uḍupi and several surrounding villages (Rao 2005, 154–55, 292). The Shivaḷḷi Brahmins, taking their name from the place, and the Sthānikas are predominant among the Tuḷu-speaking Brahmins, though there are several other caste groups.[5] While the Shivaḷḷis serve in most important temples along the coast, the Sthānikas occupy a similar place in the eastern part of the district. Each caste group is connected to an important ritual center: the Sthānikas adhere to the Shringeri *matha* (monastery), said to be founded by the Advaita philosopher Shankarāchārya in the eighth century CE, while most Shivaḷḷis have converted to the Dvaita philosophy of Mādhavāchārya (thirteenth century) and adhere to one of the eight Madhava *maṭha*s in Uḍupi. Most of these conversions from the Advaita to the Dvaita school of philosophy probably took place in the sixteenth century, when the system of the eight *maṭha*s and the Krishna temple at Uḍupi was put on a firm footing by the Madhava pontiff Vadiraja (Vasantha Madhava 1985, 43–44).

Both ritual centers have considerable influence in South Kanara, and many temples—some of which were royal temples of the Jain kings—draw large numbers of devotees. Many of them are also adherents of the *bhūta* cults, and what is striking is the coexistence of these quite different religious forms, where the popular *bhūta* cults retain their separate character with only a very moderate degree of Sanskritization, in spite of the Brahmanical presence. It is above all the Tuḷu speakers who participate in the *bhūta* cults, while many Brahmins, including the majority of Vaishnavites and the Shaivite minority, practice their own Brahmanical form of Hinduism, with several caste particularities (although Tuḷu-speaking Brahmins do associate to some degree with *bhūta* traditions). With these highly different forms of "Hinduism" as well as Jainism, Christianity, and Islam, the region's diversity is striking on the religious and the linguistic levels.

Town and country, trade and agriculture

It is in a sense paradoxical, then, that locals from all the communities refer to South Kanara as a rather neatly bounded region, the cultural specificity of which is not in

question. It does, indeed, form a very specific and rather interesting case of regional Hindu society.

Traditional society in Tuḷunadu is a conception centered on the Bunt-controlled village society of Tuḷu speakers, ritually enacted in the *nēma*. This image is opposed but not superseded by the revendications of the lower Tuḷu castes, especially the Billavas who, generally resenting Brahmin influence, try to establish their ritual, economic, and political autonomy from the dominant, landholding Bunts. They are heavily engaged in modernizing and rationalizing the cult of their own *bhūtas*, the twins Koṭi and Chennayya, seen as symbols of Billava opposition against former Bunt dominance (Carrin 2016). Some of the lowest castes like Koraga and Muṇḍala—ex-untouchables that were termed slave castes in early British times—also promote their own *bhūta*s and cult places to gain ritual autonomy and visibility, rather than joining bhakti movements to gain respectability within mainstream Hinduism.

Quite different is the case of the Mogavīra fishermen, who have a tradition of living in their own villages (*paṭṭaṇa*) and, unlike the Billavas, have traditionally maintained a good deal of autonomy in relation to the higher castes. Yet today, they are busy Sanskritizing their religion, with their main goddesses Mahāsati and Māriamman being deprived of their former right to animal sacrifice, while Mahāsati is now claimed to be Durga Parameshwarī. This is a process, however, that has not gone without protest and backlashes from within the caste, as I have described elsewhere (Tambs-Lyche 2015). We should note that even in her present Sanskritized and vegetarian form, Durga Parameshwarī is still served exclusively by Mogavīra priests.

But if we move to the towns, commerce, banking, and the professions, we remove ourselves from traditional Tuḷu society, and the dominance of the Bunts disappears. This difference between town and country is not a modern phenomenon. The ports along the coast are documented as important trading centers for close to two thousand years, with Mangalore, the most important, mentioned in the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (usually dated to the first or second century CE). The inland towns were on the trade routes linking the ports to the pepper and areca plantations in the Ghaṭ foothills and to the country across the Ghaṭs. These trade routes traversed, however, the rural agricultural homeland of traditional Tuḷu society. Apparently, there is a striking contrast between cosmopolitanism and localism here. But at least from the fifteenth to sixteenth century, the hinterland expanded, as the river valleys of the hilly subregion between the coastal plain and the Ghats were cleared and drained for rice cultivation (Vasantha Madhava 1991). This also meant an integration of the hinterland into international trade, since a large portion of the rice was exported to Oman and the Gulf, and later to Goa, after the Portuguese had established themselves there in 1510.

Historically, Jains and then Muslims dominated the cosmopolitan urban sector, oriented to the Indian Ocean trade world, but it was the Gauḍa Sāraswat Brahmins—whom I shall refer to as GSB, a term commonly used in the area—who came to monopolize the export of rice when the hinterland valleys were cleared, and from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onward they became the dominant trading community in the area (Tambs-Lyche 2011). They are still the predominant community among the South Kanara bourgeoisie. Secondarily, there are Catholic

elites, strongly present since the sixteenth century, who are originally converts from the GSB caste. Like the GSB, these Catholic Brahmins ("Bammos") speak Konkani, the language of Goa, a place to which both communities link their origins. The Muslim presence among the bourgeoisie declined from the seventeenth century and through the colonial period, though Gulf money is now effectuating something of a revival. Bunts, moving in from the countryside, began to make their presence felt from the second half of the nineteenth century (Rao 2010, 194–98), but it was only by the early twentieth century that their numbers became important, and they still represent a minority in this sector.

The Gauḍa Sāraswat Brahmins

The GSB have been present in Tuḷunadu since the thirteenth century, when they were established at Manjeshwar in Kāsaragoḍ *taluk* of Kerala, and in South Kanara from the fourteenth century, when they had arrived at Mulki, halfway along the coast between Mangalore and Uḍupi. The main immigration from Goa followed from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries (Tambs-Lyche 2011, 40–46). Their conversion from Advaita Shaivism to Dvaita Vaishnavism, under the leadership of the Kāshi and Gokarṇa *maṭha*s, began in the sixteenth century (Vasantha Madhava 1985, 45). In spite of centuries of presence in South Kanara, however, the GSB are seen, and to a large extent see themselves, as immigrants to the region. But the term "immigrant" does not really convey their relation to the region, nor that of the Mangalorean Catholics, for both groups have their main population and their cultural centers in South Kanara, and their patriotism for the region is in no way inferior to that of the Tuḷu speakers, though the groups refer to different aspects of the region's culture.

The GSB are, above all, a merchant community,[6] but they are proud of their status as Brahmins. Moreover, they are Sāraswati Brahmins, claiming to descend from the priestly caste living along the banks of the Sāraswati River during the period of the Indus civilization. Since the river dried out and the population left there somewhere around 1500 BCE, this makes the GSB descend from some of the oldest Brahmin communities of India. They claim that their custom of eating fish stems from the difficult period when the lands along the Sāraswati were drying up: the sage Sāraswat then told them to eat fish, as the males of the caste still do.[7] Rather than accepting nonvegetarianism as a stigma in relation to other Brahmins, then, the GSB tend to see fish-eating as a proof of their ancient traditions. In fact, when questions are asked about their orthodoxy, they retort that younger and upstart Brahmin castes do not have as old and genuine traditions as they themselves have. In South Kanara, they are also proud of being Northern (*gauḍa*) Brahmins, generally seen as more prestigious and ancient than their Southern (*pancadrāvida*) brethren, such as the Shivaḷḷis. In short, they see themselves as the most genuine representatives of a pan-Indian, Brahmanic civilization in South Kanara (Tambs-Lyche 2011, 307–8). In relation to their own heritage, then, the *bhūta* cults of the locals are regarded as popular culture or folklore: Hindu, yes, but not the "real" Hinduism of which they themselves are the stalwarts. In this sense, their image of their own caste is not that of "immigrants" but

rather as "civilizing colonizers" in an otherwise rather "barbarian" or "primitive" part of India.

This view is strongly opposed by the Shivaḷḷi and other local Brahmins, who see the Saraswats as ritually inferior to themselves. This view is also held by the Madhava *maṭha*s, which in many contexts, such as access to dining halls and puja rooms, do not allow the Saraswats to enter spaces reserved for Brahmins (Rao 2002, 74–75). This is particularly striking since the majority of the GSB are Madhava Dvaitas,[8] converted, however, not through the Uḍupi *maṭha*s but from the Madhava Kashi *math* at Varanasi, or from their own Gokarna *math*. In the region, the GSB—both the Mādhavas and the Smārta (Shaivite) minority—have their own caste *maṭha*s, quite independent of the centers at Uḍupi and at Shringeri. Thus the rivalry between the Shivaḷḷi and the Gauḍa Sāraswat Brahmins persists, but it need not be invoked in most colloquial settings and does not lead to much conflict, since few GSB eat at the Uḍupi *maṭha*s (though they do attend some of the important rituals there), and Shivaḷḷis do not have any business with the GSB *maṭh*s at all.

Though they are well known for their vegetarian Uḍupi restaurants (Toft Madsen and Gardella 2009; Bairy 2010), the Shivaḷḷis do not have economic power and influence comparable to the GSB, who control three of India's largest banks.[9] The small banks founded by Shivaḷḷis have all been swallowed by the dominant GSB banks.

The Catholics

The Catholics, of course, have their own ideas of the superiority of their own religion, not only over the local forms of Hinduism but over "idol-worshipping" Hinduism in general. For them, Christianity itself denotes a higher civilization. But their pride as Catholics is also linked to the particular history of the church in South Kanara, where most "Mangaloreans" strongly opposed the *Padroado*,[10] the control of the local church by the Portuguese king and the bishops of Goa, in order to gain independence as a bishopric directly under the Pope and the *propaganda fide*, the missionary organization run directly by the Vatican (Farias 1999, 90–92). From 1800 until well into the twentieth century, the Catholics saw themselves as the dominant population of Mangalore town—the GSB, who only really settled in Mangalore in the eighteenth century, were less strong here than elsewhere in South Kanara then—and they most commonly used the term "Mangalorean" to designate the Catholics of the area.

The Mangalorean Catholics were the pioneers of coffee processing in India, and at one time they owned most of the tile factories, which for a century starting around 1850 was the main industry of Mangalore. Today the tile industry is but a shadow of its former self, and Catholics have lost much of their commercial influence. But the Catholics are still a significant presence among South Kanara's bourgeoisie, notably through their position in the professions. The Catholic Saint Aloysius College in Mangalore remains one of the most prestigious educational institutions in the region.

The Bammo (ex-GSB) Catholics are quite conscious of their cultural closeness to the GSB. They, too, are proud of being Brahmins, and in Mangalore, Brahmin and non-Brahmin Catholics each tended to frequent their own church among the two big churches of Mangalore, the Rosario and the Milagres. In Kaliāṇpur,[11] too, the two

churches have a history of differential caste adherence, though the main division here—and the reason for building the second church—was the *Padroado* conflict. It may be noted that kinship and marriage among the Bammo Catholics is also quite similar to the GSB pattern, with frequent cousin marriage and alliances, where two sisters were married to the same family (Tambs-Lyche 2011, 230–40; Lobo 2000). The Konkani dialects of the two groups differ somewhat, however, mainly in vocabulary.

Modernity and the bourgeoisie

A central element in the self-image of both these groups is their claim to have been the agents of modernity in the region. As merchants, the GSB naturally tended to dominate the regional market economy from early on. This is very visible from the period of Portuguese domination of the coast in the sixteenth century, when much of the economy of the Estado da India was in the hands of the GSB (Subramaniam 1993), and it was also a commonplace observation from the beginning of the British period (Buchanan 1999). The basis for this domination was the export trade in rice, which had become important from the fifteenth century.

Here, we shall have a closer look at the transformations in the region in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, which continued in the seventeenth century. The middle zone of low hills, which was basically a dry plateau cut by numerous river valleys, had been rather sparsely populated till then. It was a transit zone from the inland plantations of pepper and areca nut, located in the foothills of the Ghaṭs, to the ports on the coast. This plantation and export economy had been the economic base of the small Jain kingdoms of the region. But from the fifteenth century we see a major effort to drain the marshy valleys and plant rice (Vasantha Madhava 1991), clearly an answer to the growing demand for rice abroad. It may well have been the GSB merchants who saw this opportunity and initiated—and possibly financed—this agricultural expansion (Tambs-Lyche 2011, 17).[12] Certainly, it was they who soon acquired a near monopoly of this trade. At the same time, it was the Bunts, already present in the middle zone, who became the owners of the drained lands, while the manpower used for draining the valleys and, later, to cultivate the rice came mainly from the Billava caste. It was in this period then, that what was to become the traditional society of South Kanara took shape, with the Bunt as "feudal" landlords and the GSB as the main commercial community.[13] Gradually the Bunts, who had formerly engaged in trade, withdrew from that sector to concentrate on the land (Rao 2010, 40–52). It was also during this period that the *bhūta* cults grew into the form they have, largely, retained till the present time (Tambs-Lyche 2017, 169–73).[14] The rice exports grew considerably after the Portuguese annexation of Goa, since the colony there became dependent on South Kanara's rice.

The GSB were thus, to a considerable extent, responsible for creating the traditional Tuḷu society, which was, more precisely, early modern. In social terms, however, this traditional society was centered on the axis of the Tuḷu-speaking Bunts and Billavas, to the exclusion of the Konkani-speaking GSB, who largely lived separately (though some also acquired land). It is this ideological constellation, with the GSB crucial to, but beyond, the traditional village, that explains why a community present in the

region for some five hundred to six hundred years is still regarded as being composed of "foreign immigrants" (Tambs-Lyche 2011, 83–84).

But it is not to the agrarian transformations of the early modern period that the GSB and the Catholics refer when they want to bolster their claims to be the agents of modernity in the region. In this context, narratives start from the colonial period. British commentators, indeed, tended to see the GSB and the Catholics as the most progressive communities in the region, which may also be read as the communities most ready to accept the goals and policies of the colonial regime. It is the reverse side of the coin, then, that is exposed when the left-wing Marxist historian Saki (1998) qualifies the GSB as a "*comprador bourgeoisie*," a group acting as intermediaries and agents for the colonial power. The pejorative implications of the term may be contested, but Saki is certainly right that the GSB and the Catholics, at least till the beginnings of the freedom movement after World War I, played rather exactly the role that the term was meant to describe—they developed the enterprises that made the colonial economy prosper in the region. From their basis in the rice trade, the GSB branched out into almost every kind of merchandise, "from pins to planes" as one well-known Uḍupi trader of the 1930s used to describe his business. The Catholics, who were the pioneer coffee-curers in India, similarly branched out into a wide range of businesses. They came to dominate the tile industry, very important for more than one hundred years in the region (Lobo 2002, 536–37), though there were also GSB involved in it. One particular branch of enterprise stands out as independent of these two communities. This is the Uḍupi restaurants, pioneers of the modern vegetarian catering in India, which were started by the "indigenous" Tuḷu-speaking Shivaḷḷi Brahmins (Madsen and Gardella 2009; Bairy 2010, 91–92).

The protestant missionaries among the Billavas were the pioneers of modern, Western-style schooling in Karnataka. But the Catholics came up strongly on this front in the latter half of the nineteenth century, with the foundation of Saint Aloysius College in Mangalore, still regarded as the region's most prestigious college. The GSB came into higher education only around the turn of the twentieth century, but since then they have come to dominate the sector of private higher education, notably with Manipal University, which was built up gradually since the 1940s, originally by the Tonse Pai family of Uḍupi (Tambs-Lyche 2011, 123–41, 150–57). The first modern, private bank in the region—now the Corporate Bank—was founded by a Muslim but taken over by GSB directors when the founder ran into difficulty in the 1920s. The Bank of Canara and the Syndicate Bank, both among India's largest banks, were GSB creations, the latter again by the ubiquitous Tonse Pai family. The GSB have a leading position in the private hospital sector, with the Manipal hospitals and several others, followed by the Catholics and, more recently, the Bunts. The latter also have their own important bank, the Vijaya Bank. These various institutions are, of course, important in several ways, but here I stress their role as symbols of modernity, while it is typical of South Kanara that they are identified with particular communities. They and numerous enterprises in many sectors underline the role of the GSB, seconded by the Catholics, as the modernizers of the region.

A communitarian social order

The importance of caste, here, should be clear. In fact, the region is characterized by the success of the private sector, which largely predates the liberalization of the Indian economy since the 1980s. This private sector is largely organized according to caste. One is made clearly aware of this when traveling on the buses—South Kanara has arguably the best and densest bus services in India—for every bus may be easily identified as to the owner's caste or community (at least one of the three largest bus companies, however, has directors from several different communities; Benjamin 2017). Shops are easily identified by the religious images shown behind the cash desk. Thus, while the banking sector, as we have seen, is thoroughly dominated by the GSB, almost all the important communities have their own banks, which are generally much smaller and often cooperative enterprises. This is true, for example, of the Catholics, the Mogavīra fishermen, and the Billavas. Similarly, the GSB and the Catholics may dominate private higher education, but there are some important Bunt and Jain institutions, and the Mogavīras have their own schools up to high-school level, while there are also the government fishermen's schools. The Billavas do not have their own education system, apart from a few Guru Narayan schools,[15] but the Protestant church in the area is predominantly a Billava church, and the system of Protestant schools therefore has a very large proportion of Billava students, both Christian and non-Christian. Protestant priesthood in the area, and the seminary that prepares for it, are largely institutions dominated by Billavas. The particular role of the GSB and of the Brahmin elite among the Catholics must therefore be seen in a context where social organization is predominantly communitarian; in institutions of all sorts, caste plays a crucial role.

Elements from the past

One element of their past that the GSB generally avoid referring to is their former importance as moneylenders. As David Hardiman (1996) states for the relationship between moneylender and peasant in northwestern India, the moneylender could be both necessary and useful to the peasant, in spite of the former's exploitation of the latter. But when members of other castes in South Kanara speak of the GSB usurers, it is the exploitative aspect of the relation that is foregrounded. Some observers also saw it this way. When the German missionary Fischer struggled to open protestant schools in the Karkala area in the 1850s and 1860s, he met considerable opposition from the GSB community (Fischer 1906, 12–15). In his characterization of this merchant group, he compares them with the Jews in his own homeland, Württemberg in south Germany. His remarks are typical examples of the anti-Semitism shared at the time by many in his homeland, but they do also reflect the resentment of many members of the Tuḷu-speaking communities in South Kanara against the GSB (Tambs-Lyche 2011, 76–83). This anti-GSB feeling seems to have been stronger in the nineteenth and the early twentieth century than it is now. Moneylending is, of course, a profession that tends to breed unpopularity, a view clearly implied in Fischer's comparison with the German Jews. The RSB,[16] a slightly inferior offshoot of the GSB caste, were equally unpopular, since they often worked as tax collectors. There does, indeed, exist a

certain animosity toward the GSB among many other castes. Still, this animosity does not amount to anything that can be compared with anti-Semitism. Yet the Jewish bourgeoisie in Germany was clearly seen as a "bourgeoisie from elsewhere," comparable to the GSB.

The Brahmin Catholics are not similarly remembered as usurers. But as Christians, they were perceived as close to the colonial power, and many in fact supported the moderate Justice Party[17] in the period just before India's independence. A main issue for most of the Indian Catholics was the question of separate electorates, seen as necessary to guard their interests as a minority. Yet the Mangaloreans were leaders among the minority who opposed separate electorates for Catholics (Farias 1999, 245–79; Lobo 2002, 770–91), a position that probably reflected their strong position locally. In Mangalore, the Catholics felt they could make themselves heard anyway; this was not the case in most locations where the Catholic minority was found.

Christianity was, and of course is still, regarded by many Indians as a foreign religion. Indeed, the Mangaloreans, as the Catholics like to call themselves, were voting as part of the Anglo-Indian constituencies that the British created for the elections of the late 1930s, and many did vote for a party that favored continued attachment to the empire. And yet, South Kanara, which has one of the highest proportions of Christians in India apart from some tribal areas, is a region where their presence has not created, and still does not seem to produce, any real anti-Christian feeling.

Though the GSB were accused of being "*comprador bourgeoisie*," as a group they were quite central to the anticolonial movement and tended to support Congress in the 1930s. But with the growing skepticism toward Gandhi's nonviolent strategies in the 1940s, many GSB turned to the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or "National Volunteer Organization").[18] When that organization was banned by the Nehru government in 1950, a good number of GSB were jailed—a time still well remembered by their families. The story repeated itself later, when several RSS supporters among the GSB went to jail during the Emergency (1975–1977). Nevertheless, there were also important congressmen from the caste at the time of the Emergency, such as T. A. Pai, who was a minister in Indira Gandhi's government, which he defended then but later criticized (Tambs-Lyche 2011, 157–62). The presence of progressive and rather universally admired elements among the GSB, notably the Tonse Pai enterprises such as the Syndicate Bank, Manipal University, and the hospital complex at Manipal, may well have contributed to reduce the earlier animosity to the GSB as moneylenders. Both radical and conservative positions among the GSB set them apart from the Bunts, however, who have been the mainstay of the Janata Dal in this region. The Janata Dal is and has been, above all, a party of the dominant farming castes in Karnataka (Carrin and Tambs-Lyche 2009).[19]

Conclusion: The integration of "foreign" elements in South Kanara

Here I arrive at a crucial question. Regions, as noted in the introduction, may be characterized by the particularities of their constellation of majority and minority groups. But these may differ in their attachment to the region, with some minorities seen as outsiders. Why, in a region where a central part of the populace—the Tuḷu

speakers—are deeply aware of and proud of their cultural particularities, do these powerful communities, occupying most of the social space of the bourgeoisie, not engender animosity, exclusion, and hate? The Basel missionary Fischer compared them to Jews in a way that was clearly anti-Semitist. Yet there is no sentiment toward the GSB that can be compared to the anti-Semitism once common in Germany. Why?

My tentative answer is that there is a major difference in the constitution of the society in which these minorities are encompassed. Germany, like other European nation-states, was largely the product of efforts to perceive the nation as a single ethnic community, making "foreign" minorities of all others. Württemberg, the region from which Fischer and other Basel missionaries came, was basically a peasant society with emerging industry, and it was largely a mono-ethnic area. Arguably, the ethnic element in nationalism was stronger in Germany than in some other European countries, such as Britain or France. And then nationalism, perhaps especially in France, was and largely still is anti-communitarian; no community loyalty should stand between the individual and the nation.

This would be extremely difficult in South Kanara, however, since communitarian dynamics in a plural situation have been fundamental to the functioning of society there and remain so to this day. Indeed, few parts of India fit John S. Furnivall's definition of the plural society (1948)[20]—where communities are separate but meet in the marketplace—so well as South Kanara does, though as critics of Furnivall have pointed out, we must add the political field of power and bargaining to the common spheres where communities meet. In such a society, there is no clear majority to turn the others into minorities. Traditionally, Tuḷu speakers dominate the countryside, while the towns have historically been the home of other communities from very early on: Muslim traders, Jain kings, Christians, and the GSB. The tradition of maintaining cultural difference within a framework of generally peaceful coexistence is very old in South Kanara. My argument is that this, in fact, may well be why the region remains a relatively peaceful corner of India.

The present power of the Hindu right has been able to produce effects in many parts of India that recall the ethno-nationalisms common in Europe. There is a break here with earlier, secular interpretations of Indian nationalism built around the concept of "unity in diversity," which de facto accepted that individuals belong *both* to a community—a caste—*and* to the nation. The minority situation typical of the European nation-state can only be created in India, then, by pitting a majority of communities against the others, which is what Hindu nationalists are attempting to do.

It has often been argued that the peaceful coexistence of plural societies is endangered when and as the different communities strengthen their boundaries and their distinction from others (e.g., Benedict 1965). This presupposes that an earlier situation of fluid or split identities is replaced by one in which these identities harden and consolidate. Such developments certainly do take place in South Kanara, as when the Billavas distance themselves from the Bunts to gain ritual and social autonomy from what used to be the landlord caste. But it seems to me that these developments do not threaten plural society in South Kanara: they take place in a context where

avenues for competition and rivalry are already well established, so that the plural social order changes but does not break down.

Indeed, cultural pluralism has become part of the very discourse that defines South Kanara as a region, and for many inhabitants the tolerance and respect that seems to govern the relations between groups from different religions there has become a matter of pride. The alternative designation of the region, Tuḷunadu, which puts the stress on Tuḷu language and culture, has become a part of this discourse, but its potential for a monocultural interpretation remains severely limited by the presence of the non-Tuḷu speakers, so that it mainly works to single out the non-Tuḷu "immigrants" as minorities whose right to be there is not seriously contested.

Rather, it is the attempt to constitute a dominant majority that appears as a threat to the other groups (Morris 1968), with the danger that a tolerant plurality be replaced by efforts to impose majority norms based on mainstream Hinduism. The Tuḷu movement has not succeeded in this. Hindu nationalism, however, is indeed present and strong in South Kanara, and the BJP is currently the strongest party. But the community that has for long been the main basis of the party's support is the "immigrant" GSB, comprised of northern (*gauda*) and not southern (*panchadravida*) Brahmins. This is important for the community's self-image as modernizing colonizers, and as representatives of the all-Indian Brahmanical tradition, in what they see as a rather primitive and barbarian land.

Hindutva politics have indeed advanced in recent years in South Kanara, to the point where some commentators talk of the cultural pluralism breaking down. The advancement of Hindutva is largely effectuated by an alliance between leading GSB and Sanskritizing elements from the lower castes, particularly from the Mogavīra community. But as far as I could observe during my last stay in 2017, the Hindutva pressure had increased conflict through several provocations, without seriously threatening the plural character of South Kanara society. After all, it is a self-conscious minority that stands for the unity of the Hindu nation in South Kanara, and this clearly weakens their position as spokespeople for majority dominance.

Such dominance is, above all, prevented by the Bunts, with their traditional base in the countryside, who are the main supporters of the identification of the region as Tuḷunadu. But again, the discourse on the region and the quest for a dominant position within it cannot be reduced to a rivalry between these two castes. This is where other vocal groups come in such as the Billavas, who are very conscious of their Tuḷu culture but strongly opposed to Bunt dominance, or the Catholics, who see themselves as modernizers rather like the GSB but who are vehemently opposed to Hindutva politics.

Whatever the community or its revendications, however, the region remains the reference. One reason for this, I think, is that apart from historically recent diasporas among several castes, all of them are firmly based in the same territory. There is no significant group whose territory extends beyond the region.[21] This is rather different from the situation on the North Indian plain, for example, where the territories of important caste groups may not coincide at all. Thus, the discourse on the region continues to focus on South Kanara as a well-defined object, without the possibility of defining the region with reference to a single dominant caste or religious group. This

apparently paradoxical situation can be understood when related to a fundamental trait of South Kanara society: the bourgeoisie comes from elsewhere.

Author

Harald Tambs-Lyche is professor emeritus at the Université de Picardie Jules Verne, Amiens, France. He has written on South Asian immigrants to Europe (*London Patidars*, 1980), and on the society and religion of Saurashtra, Gujarat (*Power, Profit and Poetry*, 1997; *The Good Country*, 2004). More recently, he has worked in South Kanara, India, and published a monograph, *Business Brahmins* (2011), on the Gauda Saraswat Brahmins of the region.

Notes

1. For the concept of dominant caste, see Srinivas (1959) and Mayer (1958).

2. The Basel missionaries, present in Mangalore since 1840, published dictionaries of the language (Männer 1886, 1888) and various religious literature. Modern secular literature in Tuḷu first appeared in the 1920s. But the number of writers and works have increased enormously at least since the 1980s, and at present the literary activity in Tuḷu is flourishing, though many writers publish their books themselves, and there is no real publishing industry apart from the Tuḷu Academy's books. In the circumstances, it is difficult to get a fuller picture of the growth of Tuḷu literature.

3. I prefer the term "bourgeoisie" to alternatives such as "the urban middle class," though the two terms overlap. On a first level, we may oppose the bourgeoisie to such categories as the nobility, the priestly group if it exists, peasants, and the working class. The origin of the term from "bourg" (borough) indicates an urban location, but also formal citizenship in the borough. While this status disappeared with modernity, the typical bourgeoisie still tend to see themselves as the social core of the urban formation. Associated with this is a certain economic (merchants being the archetypal bourgeois) and cultural (Bourdieu 1977) capital; the bourgeoisie generally sees itself as more enlightened, rational, and "civilized" than other classes. Thus, the new rich may have to pass through a stage of acceptation to enter the bourgeoisie. In Europe, this often happened by marriage; in India, the new rich often stage sumptuous religious ritual to gain acceptance. In South Kanara, in 2007, a rich low-caste owner of several hotels from Karkala celebrated the opening of a hotel in his hometown by an expensive ritual in the Venkatarama temple, belonging to the Gauda Saraswat caste. The ritual did not make him a GSB, but it did seem to signal his acceptance into the local bourgeoisie, dominated by this Brahmin caste.

4. Brückner (1995) has done an extremely thorough study of the ritual and of the texts (*paddana*s) of some of the *rajandaiva*s. Our study concerns, rather, the social and political aspects of the *nēma*.

5. Sthanika was originally a title, not a caste: Sthanikas were administrators of temples. The earliest inscriptions relating to this role are from 1215 and 1216 CE. They continued to wield considerable authority in both temples and community matters in South Kanara until the late eighteenth century. Vasantha Madhava relates the decline in their influence from then on to the rivalry between Shaivites and Vaishnavites in the area, with the latter gaining influence in modern times (Vasantha Madhava n.d.). Vasantha Madhava holds that it was from around

the sixteenth century that the term "Sthanika" came to denote a caste rather than a position (Vasantha Madhava, personal communication).

6. In Northern India, the most typical merchant communities are the various castes called Banias, but there are no South Indian castes in this group. Many Brahmin castes are in fact specializing in commerce, such as the Shrimali Brahmins of Gujarat or the Chitpavans of Maharashtra.

7. The Gauda Saraswat Brahmins refer to fish as "water vegetables." Maithili Brahmins of Bengal use a similar euphemism. Both in Bengal and Orissa, several Brahmin castes eat fish. As one Shaivite GSB remarked: "Vegetarianism was not there from the beginning. It was introduced by the Vaishnavites."

8. In opposition to the Advaita (monism) of Shankaracharya (eighth century), who held that the material world is an illusion, and the Vishistadvaita (modified monism) of Ramanuja (eleventh to twelfth century), for whom the material world was relatively real but of an inferior degree of reality to the spiritual, Madhava (thirteenth to fourteenth century) considered the material and the spiritual as equally real, which is why his philosophy is called Dvaita (dualism). The eight Madhava *matha*s of Uḍupi are the centers of this philosophical school (Rao 2002).

9. The Syndicate Bank, the Bank of Canara, and the Karnataka Bank. They also control the smaller, but still quite important, Corporation Bank.

10. When the pope divided the newly "discovered" world between Portugal and Spain in 1494, the monarch of each country was given the duty to Christianize "his" part of the world and authority (*Padroado*) over any new churches and congregations thus created. Thus until 1845 the Catholic church in South Kanara, as in Goa, was controlled by the Portuguese king, who among other things named the bishops of the area. This situation was later contested by the Propagation Fide, the missionary organization controlled directly by the Vatican. The rivalry between these ecclesiastic powers wrought bitter conflicts among the Catholics of South Kanara.

11. Kallianpur is located at the mouth of the Sita rivers, northwest of Uḍupi.

12. Vasantha Madhava (1991) furnishes very rich material on these agrarian changes. The generalizations as to the role of the GSB in this agricultural and economic transformation are mine.

13. There is nothing in our material to show the existence of a "*jajmani* system" at this period, though there were contracts with tenants and, very probably, with various service communities.

14. We may note that the important epic of Koti and Chennaya, the main *bhūta*s of the Billavas, is dated to the seventeenth century (Nandavara 2015).

15. Guru Narayan, the Hindu reformer so important among the Izhavas of Kerala (Osella and Osella 2000) also has numerous followers among the South Kanara Billavas. There is a very large Guru Narayan temple in Mangalore, a smaller one in Uḍupi, and several Guru Narayan schools, the most important of them catering to the Billava diaspora in Mumbai.

16. RSB stands for Rajapur Saraswat Brahmins. The name comes from Rajapur, an old port just north of Goa, which was under the Bijapur sultanate when the two castes left Goa. One possible explanation for their lower status is this move to a Muslim rather than a Hindu state.

17. The Justice Party stood for greater autonomy, rather than independence, in relation to the colonial power, and sought above all more equality for Indians within the colonial order.

18. The RSS is an extreme right-wing movement founded in the 1920s. The present prime minister of India, Narendra Modi, is a prominent member of the RSS.

19. At the time referred to in our 2009 paper (around 2005), a rough generalization was that the majority of the GSB supported the BJP party, the Bunts the Janata Dal, and the Billavas the Congress Party. Such generalizations are, of course, approximative, but they were shared by many people from these three groups.

20. I would hesitate to state that South Kanara *is* a plural society, since the term is normally not applied to a caste-dominated society; the caste order as well as differences in rank between the groups are important in the region. Nevertheless, Bunts, Jains, GSB, and Tuḷu-speaking Brahmins all have their grounds for claiming the highest status, and so have the Bammo Catholics. There certainly is no single, undisputed rank order in South Kanara.

21. This is of course a simplification. The GSB are, for example, present both in Kerala and North Kanara but still see South Kanara as their main territory. Their attachment to Goa is historical. Most temples of their lineage deities are situated in Goa, but there are very few GSB in Goa now. The Nadavas of North Kanara are very close to the Bunts, but they do differ in being patrilineal rather than matrilineal and speaking Kannaḍa rather than Tuḷu. The fishermen of North Kanara are not Mogavīras, and the Billavas are concentrated in South Kanara. So are the Shivaḷḷi Brahmins. In short, if we accept the Tuḷu-speaking Kāsaragoḍ district of Kerala as part of the region, all the main castes identify with the geographical area we are dealing with here.

References

Bairy, R. 2010. *Being Brahmin, Being Modern: Exploring the Lives of a Caste Today*. Delhi: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203085448

Benedict, B. 1965. *Mauritius: The Problems of a Plural Society*. London: Institute of Race Relations.

Benjamin, S. 2017. "The Multilayered Urbanization of South Kanara." In *Subaltern Urbanization: An Introduction to the Dynamics of Ordinary Towns*, edited by M.-H. Zerah and E. Denis, 199–203. Delhi: Springer.

Bhat, P. Gururaja. 1975. *Studies in Tuḷuva History and Culture*. Manipal: Published by the author.

Bourdieu, P. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brückner, H. 1995. *Fürstliche Feste: Texte und Rituale der Volksreligion der Tuḷu an der Westküste Südindiens*. Wiesbaden: Harassowitz.

Buchanan, F. 1999. *A Journey from Madras through the Countries of Mysore, Canara, and Malabar*. Vol. 3. Delhi: Asian Educational Services.

Carrin, M. 1997. "Le spectacle des *bhūta*: Observations sur les Rapports du Théâtre et du Rituel." *Purusartha* 20: 247–67.

———. 2016. "The Glorious Death of Koti and Chennaya, and the Religious and Political Inspiration of the Billava." *Irish Journal of Anthropology* 19 (2): 98–114.

Carrin, M., and H. Tambs-Lyche. 2003. "You Don't Joke with These Fellows: Power and Ritual in South Canara, India." *Social Anthropology* 11: 23–42. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8676.2003.tb00070.x

———. 2009. "A quelle nation se vouer? Les représentations de l'Etat au Sud Kanara, Inde." *Journal des Anthropologues* 118/119: 305–35. https://doi.org/10.4000/jda.4106

Chinnappa Gowda, K. 2005. *The Mask and the Message*. Mangalagangothri, India: Madipu Prakashana.

Farias, K. 1999. *The Christian Impact in South Kanara*. Mumbai: Church History Association of India.

Fischer, G. 1906. *Erquickung auf dem Wege: Missionsarbeit auf der Station Karkala von 1898–1904*. Basel: Verlag der Basler Missionsbuchhandlung.

Furnivall, J. S. 1948. *Colonial Policy and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hardiman, D. 1996. *Feeding the Bania: Peasants and Usurers in Western India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Kalmody, D., ed. 2007. *The Epic of the Warriors (Koti Chennaya Pardana)*. Chennai: National Folklore Support Centre.

Lobo, M. 2000. *Distinguished Mangalorean Catholics*. Mangalore: Camelot Publishers.

———. 2002. *The Mangalorean Catholic Community: A Professional History/Directory*. Mangalore: Camelot Publishers.

Männer, J. F. A. 1886. *Tuḷu-English Dictionary*. Mangalore: Basel Mission Press.

———. 1888. *English-Tuḷu Dictionary*. Mangalore: Basel Mission Press.

Mayer, A. C. 1958. "The Dominant Caste in a Region of Central India." *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 14: 407–27. https://doi.org/10.1086/soutjanth.14.4.3628934

Morris, H. S. 1968. *The Indians in Uganda*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.

Nandavara, V. 2015. *Koti Chennaya: A Folkloristic Study*. Mangaluru: Karnataka Tuḷu Sahitya Academy.

Osella, P., and C. Osella. 2000. *Social Mobility in Kerala*. London: Pluto Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt18dzsr9

Ramesh, Koluvail Vyasaraja. 1970. *A History of South Kanara*. Dharwar, India: Karnataka University.

Rao, B. Surendra. 2010. *Bunts in History and Culture*. Mangalore: Rashtrakavi Govind Pai Samshodana Kendra.

Rao, N. 2005. *Brahmanas of South India*. Delhi: Kalpaz.

Rao, V. 2002. *Living Traditions in Contemporary Contexts: The Madhava Matha of Uḍupi*. Delhi: Orient Longman.

Saki. 1998. *Making History: Karnataka's People and Their Past*. Bangalore: Vimukti Prakashana.

Schwartzberg, J. E. 2017. "Caste Regions of the North Indian Plain." In *Structure and Change in Indian Society*, edited by M. Singer and B. Cohn, 81–113. New York: Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315130361

Srinivas, M. N. 1959. "The Dominant Caste in Rampura." *American Anthropologist* 61 (1): 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1525/aa.1959.61.1.02a00030

Subramaniam, S. 1993. *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500–1700: A Political and Economic History*. London and New York: Longman. https://doi.org/10.1177/084387149300500212

Tambs-Lyche, H. 1994. "The Region as Object of Discourse: An Example from India." *Social Science Information* 33 (4): 731–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/053901894033004009

———. 2011. *Business Brahmins: The Gauda Saraswat Brahmins of South Kanara*. Delhi: Manohar.

———. 2015. "Hindutva and the Quest for Purity: How Popular Hinduism is Marginalized." In *Vulnerability, Marginalization and Culture: Felicitation Volume for Professor Deepak Kumar Behera*, edited by R. Pramanik, U. Skoda, and L. Guzy, 91–107. Delhi: Concept.

———. 2017. *Transaction and Hierarchy: Elements for a Theory of Caste*. Delhi: Manohar. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315141671

Toft Madsen, S., and G. T. Gardella. 2009. "Uḍupi Hotels: Entrepreneurship, Reform and Revival." Paper presented at Asian Dynamics Conference, Copenhagen, June 18, 2009.

Vasantha Madhava, K. G. 1985. *Religions in Coastal Karnataka, 1500–1763*. Delhi: Inter-India Publications.

———. 1991. *Western Karnataka: Its Agrarian Relations, A.D. 1500–1800*. Delhi: Navrang.

———. n.d. "Sthanikas: Their Socio-Religious and Economic Role in Karnataka (A.D. 1215–1800)." Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/HistoryOfSthanikaBrahmins

Veluthat, K. 2009. "Evolution of a Regional Identity." In *The Early Medieval in South India*, edited by K. Veluthat, 295–311. Delhi: Oxford.